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I
n response to continuing weakness in economic activity, the Federal
Reserve has lowered its target for the overnight federal funds rate from
61/ 2 percent to 1 percent over the past two and one-half years. Recently,
concern has been expressed in the news media and among academic econ-
omists and policymakers that additional steps to ease monetary policy
could cause the federal funds rate target to hit a lower limit of zero percent.
In this event, it would not be possible to lower the target any further, and
the Federal Reserve would have to alter its procedures for implementing
monetary policy to provide additional policy stimulus. 
Much of the commentary on the “zero bound problem” has focused
on what policy options the Federal Reserve would have and whether
they would be effective if further monetary stimulus was needed. Addi-
tionally, while the recent discussion has been mostly hypothetical, some
commentators have suggested that the current situation has disturbing
parallels to the U.S. economy in the 1930s and to the Japanese economy
over the past decade. In both situations, with short-term interest rates
near zero, monetary policy has been seen to be ineffective in reversing a
prolonged economic slump.
Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. is a vice president and economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City. Taisuke Nakata, a research associate at the bank, helped prepare the
article. The article is on the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org.
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This article examines how monetary policy can be conducted when
short-term interest rates reach the zero bound and whether policy is
likely to be effective in this situation. The article suggests that concerns
about the zero bound as a constraint on monetary policy are greatly
exaggerated. Even when short-term interest rates are near zero, central
banks will generally have considerable scope to expand bank credit and
to lower longer-term interest rates. And, in the event the banking
system does not function effectively or long-term rates also reach zero,
further options are available to provide policy stimulus. Moreover, a
closer look at the historical experience in the United States and Japan
suggests that the central problem in these situations was not the exis-
tence of a zero bound per se but, rather, a weakened banking system
that limited the effectiveness of monetary policy.
The first section of the article explores the nature of the zero bound
problem, focusing on the complications for implementing monetary
policy, possible effects on short-term financial markets, and the poten-
tial scope for policy once the zero bound is reached. The second section
examines the principal options a central bank has to implement policy
when short-term rates reach zero. These include: increasing the quantity
of reserves in the banking system, directly targeting longer-term interest
rates, and managing financial market expectations of future monetary
policy actions. The third section looks at the historical experience of the
United States in the 1930s and Japan over the last decade to evaluate
the significance of the zero bound as an impediment to monetary
policy. The fourth section discusses a further range of policy options
open to a central bank in the more extreme situation where there is little
additional scope for lowering longer-term rates and where the banking
system is dysfunctional. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE ZERO BOUND PROBLEM
Because nominal interest rates cannot ordinarily be negative, once
the overnight rate reaches zero, a central bank that targets the overnight
rate will have to change its operating procedures to ease policy further.1
The zero bound also poses potential problems for the functioning ofECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 7
short-term money markets that could conceivably have implications for
monetary policy. In light of these potential difficulties, it is important
to understand the scope for monetary policy at the zero bound.
Complications for the implementation of monetary policy 
To see the problems posed by the zero bound, it is helpful to briefly
consider how monetary policy operates. Generally speaking, central
banks implement monetary policy by altering the price and quantity of
reserve or settlement balances held by depository institutions at the
central bank. For example, central banks ease policy by supplying more
reserve balances than are demanded at the current overnight interest
rate, which pushes the overnight rate lower. 
A key issue for the central bank is to decide how many reserve bal-
ances to supply to achieve its ultimate objectives of price stability and
sustainable economic growth. One traditional method of doing this is
to determine what growth in the supply of money is needed to achieve
its desired inflation and growth objectives and then to figure out how
many reserves to provide to reach this money growth objective. In this
framework, policy is eased or tightened by increasing or decreasing the
targeted quantity of reserves.
In practice, most central banks have shifted away from this “quan-
titative” approach in recent years in favor of targeting the overnight
interest rate on reserve balances. Under interest rate targeting, the
central bank determines what level of the overnight interest rate is con-
sistent with its inflation and growth objectives and then supplies the
necessary amount of reserves to achieve this target interest rate. In this
approach to implementing monetary policy, policy is eased or tightened
by lowering or raising the target interest rate.
Central banks have moved away from quantitative targeting to
interest rate targeting for two main reasons. First, it is technically easier
to implement interest rate targeting because this approach does not rely
on knowledge of money demand or the behavior of the banking system,
both of which have undergone significant changes in many countries in
recent years due to deregulation and financial innovation.2 Second,
interest rate targeting appears to be more transparent and easier for
financial markets to understand. Financial market participants tend tothink in terms of how current and future monetary policy are likely to
affect the overall structure of interest rates. This task may be easier when
the stance of policy is calibrated in terms of an interest rate target rather
than a quantity of reserves.3
The main disadvantage of interest rate targeting, of course, is that this
approach is subject to the zero bound, and once the bound is reached,
policymakers cannot ease policy by reducing the target interest rate. In
contrast, reserves targeting is not limited by a zero bound. Indeed, the
ability of the central bank to ease policy under the quantitative approach
is only limited by its ability to purchase eligible assets via open market
operations or to provide funds through the discount window.4
Once the zero bound is reached, central banks will be forced to
change their procedures for implementing a further easing of monetary
policy; that is, they will need a new guide for determining how many
reserves to supply to achieve their longer-run macroeconomic objectives.
Potential options are examined in more detail in Section II of this article.
Potential effects on short-term financial markets
In addition to implications for the implementation of monetary
policy, the zero bound may also influence the functioning of short-term
money markets, which in turn could affect the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. The most immediate effects of the zero bound are
likely to be seen in the overnight market for reserve balances. This
market serves primarily as a mechanism for depository institutions to
eliminate excesses and deficiencies in their reserve accounts. In order for
the overnight rate to reach zero on an ongoing basis, all depository
institutions would need to be in a continual position of excess reserves,
because if any institutions experienced a reserve deficiency, they would
seek to borrow in the overnight market, resulting in a positive overnight
rate. Thus, once the zero bound is reached, the overnight market would
likely cease to function.5 In this situation, the monetary transmission
mechanism could be severely affected if a central bank tried to increase
the quantity of reserves but depository institutions decided to hold the
additional reserves as excess reserves rather than making loans or pur-
chasing earning assets.6
8 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYAs the overnight rate approaches the zero bound, other short-term
money market rates are also likely to fall toward zero as investors begin
to extend the maturity of their investment portfolio in search of higher
yields. Consequently, other short-term money markets could be
affected by the zero bound problem. For example, considerable atten-
tion has been focused recently on the implications of the zero bound for
money market mutual funds. Because money market funds invest
exclusively in short-term assets, as the yields on these assets decline,
some funds may have difficulty covering their costs while still paying a
return sufficient to keep investors in the fund. Furthermore, if money
funds were to experience an outflow of funds, this could impact the
commercial paper market since money funds are the largest institu-
tional supplier of financing to this market.
While the zero bound could cause shrinkage in the size and number
of money funds, the effects on the monetary transmission mechanism
may be limited. If investors withdraw from money funds, the funds
transferred would likely end up in depository institutions.7 Moreover,
corporations that experienced difficulty in obtaining funds in the com-
mercial paper market would likely turn to banks, leading to a somewhat
higher cost of short-term credit for corporations but relatively little
impact on the monetary transmission mechanism.
What is the scope for policy at the zero bound?
In light of the potential effects of the zero bound on the implemen-
tation of monetary policy and short-term financial markets, it is
important to determine what scope there is for policy to provide addi-
tional stimulus at the zero bound. This requires a closer look at the
monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Generally speaking, monetary policy does not have a direct or
immediate effect on economic activity. Rather, monetary policy influ-
ences the economy by affecting the cost and quantity of credit provided
by the financial system. There are several channels through which mon-
etary policy operates, as represented in the stylized view of the
transmission mechanism in Figure 1.8
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In Figure 1, the first channel (1) highlights the role of changes in
short-term interest rates in affecting economic activity via both a direct
effect on the cost of short-term credit and indirectly through long-term
interest rates. Thus, for example, changes in short-term rates may
directly influence short-term consumer and business spending. In addi-
tion, to the extent that changes in short-term rates are transmitted to
longer-term rates, there may be an effect on residential construction
and business fixed investment.
The second channel (2) emphasizes the quantity of credit provided
through the banking system. As discussed above, monetary policy
actions have their immediate effect on the overnight interest rate and on
the quantity of reserves in the banking system. When banks experience
an increase in reserves, they will generally use these reserves to acquire
earning assets—loans and investment securities—rather than holding
excess reserves that do not pay interest. In the short run, banks may loan
these reserves in the overnight market, but over the longer run, they will
Figure 1
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make higher-yielding consumer and business loans and purchase invest-
ment securities. This expansion of bank credit will directly affect
economic activity and will also help lower longer-term interest rates.
The third channel (3) indicates the potential ability of a central
bank to directly affect long-term interest rates without going through
short-term rates or bank credit. In principle, a central bank can directly
influence long-term rates by purchasing long-term securities or by alter-
ing financial market expectations of the future course of monetary
policy. This channel is shown by a dotted line rather than a solid line to
emphasize that this channel is not ordinarily employed by central banks
for reasons discussed in the next section.
In this stylized view of the monetary transmission mechanism, the
zero bound effectively closes down the first channel. That is, at the zero
bound, the central bank loses the ability to use a reduction in short-
term rates to directly stimulate economic activity or lower longer-term
rates. Monetary policy can continue to be effective in stimulating eco-
nomic activity, however, if the other two channels are operational. The
second channel will function as long as the banking system is willing
and able to use an increase in reserves to expand its credit creation. The
third channel will function if the central bank is willing and able to
directly lower longer-term rates. 
Thus, in principle, even if the overnight rate is zero, a central bank
may have considerable scope to expand bank credit and lower longer-
term rates to stimulate the economy. The next section of the article
explores these two channels in more depth, focusing on some of the
practical difficulties in implementing monetary policy in this environ-
ment. Even in the event that all three channels shown in Figure 1 cease
to function effectively, a central bank may still have to ability to provide
economic stimulus through additional, less traditional channels. These
options are discussed in Section IV.9
II. POLICY OPTIONS AT THE ZERO BOUND
When the zero bound becomes effective, central banks can poten-
tially provide additional stimulus to economic activity by expanding
the quantity of reserves in the banking system, by directly targeting
longer-term interest rates, and by attempting to manage financial12 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
market expectations of future monetary policy actions. Each of the
alternatives has advantages and disadvantages, and none is clearly supe-
rior to the others. 
Quantitative reserves targeting
As noted in the previous section, while a central bank cannot set an
interest rate target below zero, it can provide an essentially unlimited
amount of reserves to the banking system. Thus, one solution to the
zero bound constraint is for a central bank to target the amount of
reserves provided to the banking system and to increase the targeted
quantity of reserves as needed to implement a policy easing. The
banking system would be expected to use the excess reserves created by
the central bank to expand bank credit by making additional loans and
purchasing securities, thus helping to push down medium and longer-
term interest rates.10
Since reserves targeting appears to be a rather obvious and simple
solution to the zero bound problem, one might ask whether it has some
conceptual or practical limitations to its effectiveness. Indeed, one
common criticism of this approach is that the reserves channel, as
described in Figure 1, would not operate at the zero bound. When the
overnight rate is zero, banks clearly have no incentive to loan their
excess reserves in the overnight market. Thus, it is claimed, banks
would simply hold any additional reserves provided by the central bank
in the form of excess reserves and would not expand lending or pur-
chase securities.
The weakness in this argument is that it implicitly assumes that
banks view higher excess reserves as temporary. If additions to excess
reserves are seen as temporary and there is no incentive to loan them in
the overnight market at a zero return, banks will simply hold the addi-
tional reserves. In this situation, the reserves channel would cease to
function effectively. If, instead, banks view an increase in excess reserves
as relatively permanent, they will want to use these reserves to acquire
earning assets that have a positive risk-adjusted yield. This increased
quantity of excess reserves allows the banking system to engage in a
multiple expansion of bank credit through the traditional reserves mul-
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reserves targeting at the zero bound is whether banks believe that an
easing of monetary policy that creates additional excess reserves is likely
to be relatively long lasting or quickly reversed.
There are also some practical issues involved in implementing
reserves targeting. One problem is the difficulty in determining the right
amount of reserves to stimulate economic activity. As discussed earlier,
reserves targeting requires additional information about the demand for
money and reserves that is not needed under interest rate targeting. If it
is hard to obtain accurate information on these factors, a central bank
may have difficulty determining the appropriate quantity of reserves to
target. In practice, a central bank may be forced to pursue a trial and
error approach, progressively increasing the reserves target and watching
to see the effects on bank credit and longer-term interest rates. 
A second practical issue is how much stimulus is likely to come
from the banking system. Generally, when interest rates are very low,
economic activity is also weak, and banks experience very weak loan
demand. If, in addition, banks are weakly capitalized because of previ-
ous loan losses or under increased regulatory scrutiny, they may be
reluctant to make new loans. Thus, there are important practical ques-
tions about whether the reserves targeting approach can be relied on to
work effectively in a low interest rate environment.
Targeting longer-term interest rates
As an alternative to quantitative reserves targeting, a central bank
might attempt to directly lower longer-term rates (Figure 1). One way
of doing this is to purchase large amounts of longer-term securities to
drive up their price and lower their yield. Another approach is to estab-
lish a ceiling on the yield on these securities by offering to purchase any
securities whose yield might rise above the target rate. 
Conceptually, setting a ceiling for a long-term interest rate or set of
rates is likely to be the most straightforward approach to achieving
lower long-term rates. In this approach, the central bank would estab-
lish a maximum interest rate for a long-term security—set below the
current market rate—and agree to buy as many additional securities as
necessary to keep markets rates from rising above the ceiling.1114 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Alternatively, instead of establishing a formal ceiling for a long-term
rate, a central bank might shift its open market purchases from short-
term to longer-term securities, relying on the volume of its purchases to
raise the price and lower the yield on the longer-term securities. This
procedure is essentially a variant of the reserves targeting approach dis-
cussed above, as the direct effects of central bank purchases on
longer-term interest rates are accompanied by an expansion of bank
reserves and bank credit.
Still another approach that has been suggested is for a central bank
to attempt to “twist” the yield curve by purchasing longer term securi-
ties to lower their yield while simultaneously selling short-term
securities to raise their yield. This approach might be appropriate if a
central bank wished to avoid some of the negative effects of the zero
bound on the functioning on short-term money markets. In contrast to
the preceding procedure, this approach would not typically involve any
expansion in bank reserves because the sale of short-term securities
would offset the purchase of longer-term securities. 
Generally speaking, central banks have relatively little experience
with directly manipulating longer-term interest rates. In the United
States, for example, the Federal Reserve has not attempted to establish
a ceiling for longer-term rates except in support of Treasury debt man-
agement operations during and immediately after World War II
(Meulendyke, pp. 33-34; Hetzel and Leach). Less formal attempts to
manipulate longer-term rates have also been rare. During the 1930s,
the Federal Reserve made some attempt to keep longer-term interest
rates low by selling short-term securities and purchasing longer-term
securities to lengthen the maturity of its security portfolio (Chandler,
pp. 308-09 and 340-42). And, in the early 1960s, the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury briefly attempted to twist the term structure to deal
with balance of payments and debt management problems (Meu-
lendyke, pp. 38-39).
Why have central banks been so reluctant to manipulate longer-
term interest rates directly? There appear to be several reasons. First,
less formal attempts to influence longer-term rates suffer from some of
the same problems as reserves targeting; that is, it is difficult to deter-
mine how many securities should be purchased to achieve a given
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quantity of long-term securities exposes the central bank to potentially
large capital losses once the economy recovers and interest rates begin
to rise again. Third, central banks may be concerned that their deci-
sions as to which long-term rates to target may influence credit
allocation in an undesirable way. Because short-term capital markets
tend to be deeper and more liquid than longer-term markets, a central
bank can operate in short-term markets without as much influence on
the structure of rates. Similarly, operating through the reserves channel
allows the banking system rather than the central bank to determine
credit allocation. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, establishing a ceiling for
longer-term rates may pose problems for a central bank’s credibility and
independence.12 Once economic recovery begins, investors holding large
amounts of longer-term securities are likely to be concerned about the
possibility of large capital losses as rates begin to rise. As a result, once
markets believe that interest rates will rise, the central bank will be forced
to purchase an increased volume of securities, causing bank reserves to
rise rapidly. Consequently, the central bank has a strong incentive to end
the ceiling program quickly to forestall a buildup of inflationary pres-
sures. At the same time, the government is likely to resist the end of the
program because this would raise its borrowing costs. In these circum-
stances, financial markets may begin to doubt the central bank’s
commitment to long-run price stability, which would put further pres-
sure on market rates due to higher inflation premiums.
Managing market expectations about future policy
A third option open to central banks when the zero bound is
reached is to attempt to lower longer-term interest rates by managing
market expectations of future monetary policy actions.13 This approach
reflects an increased recognition of the importance of policy expecta-
tions in determining the behavior of interest rates and asset prices.
Standard theories of the term structure of interest rates suggest that
longer-term interest rates are determined mainly by current short-term
rates and by market expectations of future short-term rates. Central
banks largely control current short-term rates by setting a target for the16 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
overnight rate, and market expectations of how central banks will set
future targets for the overnight rate should determine the expected path
of future short-term rates (Roley and Sellon). 
In this framework, current and expected future policy actions play a
key role in the determination of longer-term rates. A decision by the
central bank to reduce the current target for the overnight rate will also
lower long-term rates by an amount that depends on how long markets
believe that the new lower rate will be maintained. For example, if the
target rate is lowered by 50 basis points and is expected to remain at the
new level for a year, interest rates at maturities out to one year will also
fall by 50 basis points. However, rates on longer-term securities will fall
by smaller amounts, because the target rate is expected to be raised
again after one year.
At any point in time, the current term structure incorporates finan-
cial markets’ best guess as to the future course of monetary policy.14 A
relatively steep yield curve, with long-term rates significantly higher
than current short-term rates, suggests that markets believe that policy
will be tightened in the future through an increase in future target rates.
In this situation, monetary policy can significantly lower longer-term
rates only to the extent that the central bank can convey the message
that policy will not be tightened as much or as soon as markets expect.
That is, the central bank must convince financial markets that the path
of future short-term rates will be lower than the path that is currently
incorporated in the term structure. 
When the zero bound is not a problem, a central bank can convey
this message by taking an action—cutting the target rate—and by issuing
an accompanying statement indicating whether this action is likely to be
temporary or more persistent. Things are more difficult, however, when
the zero bound is effective because the central bank can no longer use the
target rate as a policy lever to help communicate its intentions. 
At the zero bound, central bank statements about future policy
actions are likely to play a key role in its ability to lower longer-term
rates. Generally speaking, a central bank has a range of options reflect-
ing its willingness to commit to future policy actions and the form of
this commitment. For example, a central bank might issue a relatively
open-ended statement suggesting that policy will remain accommoda-
tive as long as appropriate to stimulate economic recovery. Alternatively,ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 17
it can make a more explicit statement about future policy. For example,
the central bank might commit to keeping rates low for a specified
period of time or until economic growth or inflation reached a specific
quantitative target. 
The difficult problem faced by a central bank in this situation is that
there is likely to be a conflict between its desire to lower rates currently
and its desire to maintain flexibility in its future policy options. A more
open-ended statement provides a central bank with considerable flexibil-
ity in future policy actions. However, it may be less effective in lowering
rates now and more prone to a rapid rise in rates if the economy begins
to improve faster than expected. This would occur if markets believe that
an open-ended policy statement is a signal that the current stance of
policy likely to be relatively temporary. In contrast, a more explicit com-
mitment may be more effective in lowing rates now and slowing their
future rise.15 But, if the economy improves much faster than expected,
the central bank may regret its longer-term commitment and wish that it
still had the option of tightening policy more aggressively.
This discussion suggests that the form of a central bank’s commit-
ment strategy and its public statements are likely to be extremely
important in its ability to influence long-term interest rates. Indeed, if a
central bank chooses an explicit commitment strategy, it is less likely to
regret this decision if the strategy is firmly anchored to its longer-run
objectives. Thus, for example, a strategy based on an explicit inflation
target is likely to be superior to one based on a short-term measure of
improvement in economic activity.16
In summary, when the zero bound restricts a central bank’s ability
to ease policy by lowering its target interest rate, there may still be con-
siderable scope for a central bank to stimulate the economy by
expanding the quantity of bank reserves and by lowering longer-term
interest rates. Although the three options discussed above could be
effective in principle, there are important practical questions about their
effectiveness. In this situation, it may be helpful to look at the experi-
ence of central banks in dealing with the zero bound problem. 18 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
III. CENTRAL BANK EXPERIENCE WITH THE 
ZERO BOUND
Historically, hitting the zero bound has been so rare that central
banks have little practical experience in conducting policy in this envi-
ronment. The two most notable examples are the experience of the
United States during the 1930s and in Japan over the past decade.17 In
both situations, monetary policy has been perceived as being ineffective
in offsetting a prolonged economic slump, and the zero bound has been
identified as a key factor limiting the effectiveness of monetary policy.
A closer look at these two episodes suggests that, although the zero
bound had a large effect on short-term financial markets, the central
bank was able to conduct monetary policy once the zero bound was
reached and had some success in lowering long-term interest rates. In
both episodes, however, a weakened banking system appears to have
reduced the functioning of the reserves channel and so limited the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy.18
The U.S. experience in the 1930s
Over the years, much has been written about the role of monetary
policy in the 1930s and reasons for its apparent ineffectiveness in stim-
ulating economic activity. The predominant view among economists
and economic historians is that monetary policy was seriously flawed in
both design and execution (Friedman and Schwartz; Meltzer). In par-
ticular, the failure of the Federal Reserve to actively ease policy in the
face of a massive decline in the money supply has been identified as a
key factor in the economic depression from 1929-33. And, the decision
of the Federal Reserve to double reserve requirements in 1936-37 was
seen as an important contributing factor to the recession of 1937-38.
A second view of the role of monetary policy during the 1930s
places relatively more emphasis on limits to the effectiveness of mone-
tary policy in a low interest rate environment, rather than policy errors,
as a central problem facing the Federal Reserve during this period. A
prominent part of this literature emphasizes that the U.S. financial
system may have been stuck in a “liquidity trap” in the 1930s.19 In this
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because financial markets believed that any decline in rates would only
be temporary, and bank credit did not expand because banks held
excess reserves instead of making loans and purchasing securities. The
existence of a zero bound on short-term interest rates may have con-
tributed to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in this environment.
Was there a zero bound problem? To see whether the zero bound
posed a problem for the Federal Reserve during the 1930s, it is helpful
to examine the behavior of interest rates and financial markets during
this period. Although detailed data on interest rates and financial
markets are not available for this period, what is known is the federal
funds rate fell close to zero in late 1932, and yields on very short-term
Treasury securities were near zero and sometimes negative from late
1932 on. Rates on short-term (4-6 month) commercial paper fell from
a peak of 6.25 percent in October 1929 to 1 percent in the spring of
1934 and remained at 1 percent or below thereafter.
Not surprisingly, short-term money markets were severely affected.
According to Willis, the federal funds market effectively ceased to func-
tion from 1933 until the late 1930s, partly because of an excess supply
of funds and partly because of concerns about the risks of interbank
lending. Similarly, volume outstanding in the commercial paper market
fell by 85 percent from the beginning of 1929 to the spring of 1933.
Although short-term interest rates appear to have reached the zero
bound by the mid-1930s, Federal Reserve policy does not appear to
have been greatly affected. Indeed, narrative accounts of policy discus-
sions and decisions during this period do not suggest any concern by
the Federal Reserve that it might not be able to ease policy once short-
term interest rates reached zero or that it might need to resort to new
methods to implement policy (Chandler; Meltzer). 
In light of more recent policy discussions, this conclusion might
seem somewhat surprising. It is important to recognize, however, that
the Federal Reserve did not use an interest rate target to conduct mon-
etary policy during the 1930s. Instead, policymakers focused primarily
on the quantity of reserves provided to the banking system through the
discount window and open market operations. Rather than being used
as a target, short-term interest rates served as a measure of the stance of
monetary policy—that is, whether the Federal Reserve was providing
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that there was ample reserve availability, while high rates suggested that
credit was tight. Put differently, the zero bound was not an important
constraint on monetary policy during the 1930s because the Federal
Reserve effectively targeted reserves, not interest rates.
Was monetary policy effective? While the zero bound does not appear
to have been a constraint on the implementation of monetary policy,
this does not imply that monetary policy was effective in the 1930s. As
discussed earlier, the key to policy effectiveness at the zero bound is
whether alternative monetary policy channels are functioning.
Evidence on the scope and effectiveness of monetary policy during
the 1930s is contained in Charts 1 through 6. Chart 1 illustrates the evo-
lution of the Treasury yield curve over this period highlighting three dates:
May 1929 (before the stock market crash); December 1933 (after the
brunt of the Depression); and December 1940 (prior to the U.S. involve-
ment in World War II).20 In 1929, shortly before the stock market crash,
the yield curve was inverted with short-term rates above long-term rates,
reflecting tight monetary policy and the expectation that rates would fall
in the future. By 1933, short-term rates had fallen considerably, but long-
term rates had hardly moved, resulting in an upward sloping yield
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curve.21 Thus, by 1933, while there was very little scope for monetary
policy to lower short-term rates because of the zero bound, there was con-
siderable scope to reduce long-term rates by lowering expected future
short-term rates. Finally, by 1940, the entire yield curve had shifted down
with a considerable decline in medium and long-term interest rates. The
obvious question raised by this chart is whether monetary policy con-
tributed to the decline in longer-term rates over this period.
Once the zero bound on short-term rates was reached in 1932-33,
Federal Reserve policy became significantly more accommodative as
evidenced by a dramatic increase in the quantity of reserves in the
banking system.22 Chart 2 shows the behavior of total bank reserves
and excess reserves from 1929 to 1941. From 1929 to 1933, total
reserves had remained essentially unchanged, despite a collapse in the
economy and the money supply, providing evidence that the Federal
Reserve failed to actively offset the decline in economic activity during
the deepest part of the Depression. After 1933, however, the course of
monetary policy changed, and total bank reserves increased dramati-
cally over the next several years. 
Chart 2
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According to the discussion in the previous section, this increase in
total reserves should have led to an expansion in bank credit. Indeed, as
shown in Chart 3, after falling from 1929-33, bank credit began to
expand rapidly until slowed by the increase in reserve requirements in
1936-37. Interestingly, most of the increase in bank credit took the
form of bank purchases of investment securities as bank lending
remained weak throughout the 1930s (Chart 3). Moreover, a more
detailed breakdown of bank security purchases shows that all of the
increase took the form of government securities (Chart 4).23
Although the increase in bank credit suggests that monetary policy
provided some stimulus during this period, the size of the increase in
bank credit was far smaller than might be expected because banks had
greatly increased their holding of excess reserves (Chart 2). Indeed, the
increased demand for excess reserves appears to have blunted much of
the expansionary effect of monetary policy during this period. 
Various reasons have been cited for banks’ increased holding of
excess reserves. The collapse of the federal funds market and reduced
functioning of other short-term money markets may have reduced the
ability and incentive of banks to make short-term loans to other financial
Chart 3
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intermediaries. In addition, the fragile state of the banking system after
the wave of bank failures from 1929 to 1933 may have created a desire
for greater liquidity by banks in a period of economic uncertainty. More-
over, the weak economy may have reduced the demand for bank loans.
Interestingly, at the time, Federal Reserve Governor Eugene Meyer sug-
gested that the failure of banks to use excess reserves to expand bank
credit was caused largely by uncertainty about future Federal Reserve
policy (Meltzer, pp. 376-77).
The large purchases of government securities by banks helped con-
tribute to the decline in longer-term interest rates on government and
corporate securities after 1933 (Chart 5). Thus, yields on government
bonds fell from 3.2 percent at the beginning of 1933 to 1.9 percent by
the end of 1940. Similarly, yields on AAA corporate bonds declined
from 4.4 percent to 2.7 percent over the same period.
The Federal Reserve also altered the maturity of its security portfo-
lio over this period in an attempt to keep long-term rates low. Although
policymakers explicitly rejected the idea of targeting or pegging long-
term rates, they did adopt a policy of supporting Treasury debt
Chart 4
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management operations by buying and selling long-term securities to
reduce the volatility of long-term rates (Chandler, pp. 308-10). Over
the course of the 1930s, increased purchases of long-term securities
coupled with reduced purchases of short-term securities resulted in a
significant lengthening of the maturity of the Federal Reserve’s security
portfolio. Indeed, from late 1933 to the end of 1941, although the
overall size of the Federal Reserve’s security portfolio was little changed,
the proportion of longer-term Treasury bonds rose from 18 percent to
65 percent, and holdings of short-term securities—Treasury bills and
certificates—essentially disappeared (Chart 6).
In summary, while short-term interest rates in the United States were
near zero for much of the 1930s, the Federal Reserve was not constrained
in its ability to implement monetary policy, and there is little evidence
that a liquidity trap prevented the use of monetary policy to stimulate
economic activity.24 After 1933, the Federal Reserve was able to ease
policy by expanding the amount of reserves in the banking system and
also increased its purchases of longer-term government securities. These
actions led to a rise in bank credit and helped lower longer-term interest
rates. At the same time, the increased holding of excess reserves by the
Chart 5
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banking system underscores the potential difficulties in implementing
reserves targeting in a low interest rate environment, especially when
accompanied by a weakened banking system.
Japan’s experience with the zero bound
A second example of the zero bound can be found in the recent expe-
rience in Japan. Since the collapse of the housing and stock market asset
price bubbles in the late 1980s, the Japanese economy has experienced a
prolonged period of weak economic growth. Over this period, the Bank
of Japan has eased monetary policy on several occasions and short-term
interest rates have trended lower, reaching zero by the late 1990s. 
The U.S. and Japanese experiences with the zero bound show
important differences and similarities. In contrast to the U.S. experi-
ence in the 1930s, the zero bound has posed greater difficulties for
monetary policy in Japan. One reason is that in recent years Japan has
implemented policy via an interest rate target. Consequently, a desire to
ease policy at the zero bound required a formal change in monetary
Chart 6
COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECURITY
PORTFOLIO: 1929-1941
















1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Bills and certificates
Notes
Bonds26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
policy operating procedures. A second reason is that policymakers in
Japan were hesitant to adopt alternative policy procedures either
because they doubted the effectiveness of these procedures or because
they were reluctant to employ them. An important similarity in the two
episodes is the weak condition of the banking system, which appears to
have limited the effectiveness of monetary policy in stimulating eco-
nomic activity.
The nature of the zero bound problem in Japan. In 1995, the Bank of
Japan altered its traditional operating procedures based on changes in its
discount rate and adopted a formal target for the overnight interest rate.
At the time of this change, interest rates were already extremely low, and
the initial target for the uncollateralized call money rate was only 0.50
percent. Thus, even in 1995, the Bank of Japan had very little scope for
lowering its target interest rate before encountering the zero bound.
As it turned out, however, further policy ease was not required over
the next few years as the Japanese economy experienced somewhat
stronger growth. The need to ease policy reemerged in the fall of 1998,
however, and the Bank of Japan lowered the target rate to 0.25 percent
in response to the Asian financial crisis. 
The zero bound was first reached in February 1999 when the Bank
of Japan lowered its target for the overnight call rate from 0.25 percent
to near zero and adopted the so-called “zero interest rate policy” or
ZIRP.25 Despite appearances, the zero bound does not appear to have
been an important constraint on monetary policy during this period
because the Bank of Japan consistently believed that the economic
outlook was improving so that further policy easing was not required.26
Indeed, based on an improved economic outlook and concerns about
distortions in financial markets caused by the zero interest rate policy,
the Bank of Japan tightened policy in August 2000 and raised the target
call rate back to 0.25 percent.
The zero bound became a more serious constraint on monetary
policy in March 2001 when, in the face of much weaker economic
growth and increased deflationary pressures, the Bank of Japan desired
to easy policy by more than could be achieved by lowering the target
rate back to zero.27 At that point, policymakers were forced to adopt
new procedures for implementing monetary policy.28ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 27
Alternatives to interest rate targeting at the zero bound. Even though
the zero bound was not strictly binding during the “zero interest rate”
period, Bank of Japan policymakers did discuss extensively what alter-
native procedures could be employed if further easing was required.29
Generally speaking, Bank of Japan officials had little confidence that
reserve targeting would be an effective alternative, in part, because of
the weak condition of the Japanese banking system. In addition, policy-
makers were also extremely reluctant to engage in large-scale purchases
of long-term government securities because it was thought that such
actions might jeopardize the Bank of Japan’s recently obtained formal
independence and reduce the bank’s credibility in financial markets. 
Because of these concerns, Bank of Japan officials relied more
heavily on trying to manage market expectations of future policy
actions. For example, during the ZIRP, the Bank of Japan committed to
maintaining the target rate near zero “until deflationary concerns are
dispelled.” By making this commitment, policymakers hoped to reduce
long-term rates by lowering market expectations of the future path of
short-term interest rates. 
This approach was criticized by some as being too vague and open-
ended to be effective in lowering long-term interest rates. Specifically,
the statement did not formally specify the criteria the Bank of Japan
would use in deciding the conditions for terminating the ZIRP.31 Thus,
the interpretation was left open to financial markets. In fact, financial
markets appear to have thought that the policy would only be in effect
for a relatively short period of time.32 If so, the ZIRP would not be
expected to lead to a significant decline in long-term interest rates.
In March 2001, faced with a weakening economic outlook and evi-
dence of increasing deflationary pressures, the Bank of Japan enacted
more radical changes in its monetary policy procedures. Interest rate
targeting was abandoned in favor of reserves targeting or “quantitative
easing,” and the Bank greatly expanded its purchases of long-term gov-
ernment securities. In addition, policymakers adopted a more explicit
commitment to keep interest rates low for an extended period of time.28 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Since March 2001, despite continuing misgivings about the likely
effectiveness of reserves targeting, the Bank of Japan has greatly
expanded the amount of reserves in the banking system. From an initial
target of 5 trillion yen, over time, the quantitative target for current
account balances has risen in a series of steps to 27-32 trillion yen.
The Bank of Japan has also greatly expanded its purchases of long-
term government securities.33 Since March 2001, the purchase of
long-term government securities has increased from 400 billion yen to
1.2 trillion yen per month and the proportion of these securities in the
bank’s portfolio has risen from 64 percent to 70 percent.34
As part of its new operating procedures, the Bank of Japan also
adopted a much more explicit statement of the conditions under which
the new procedures would be abandoned. The bank indicated that the
new procedures would be maintained “until the consumer price index
(excluding perishables, on a nationwide statistics) registers stably a zero
percent or an increase year on year.” Thus, in contrast to the rather open-
ended nature of the commitment strategy under the ZIRP, the new
statement provided an objective measure that markets could use in fore-
casting the likely duration of the new procedures. To the extent that this
commitment strategy is credible to financial markets, it might be
expected to help lower longer-term rates in the near term and to delay an
increase in rates when the economy begins to improve.35
Policy effectiveness at the zero bound. As discussed earlier, the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy at the zero bound depends largely on the
functioning of the bank reserves channel and on whether there is scope
for lowering long-term interest rates. In both respects, the Bank of
Japan appears to have faced a very difficult situation. Indeed, as noted
above, Bank of Japan policymakers were skeptical that the reserves
channel would operate effectively given the weak condition of the
Japanese banking system. Following the collapse of stock prices and real
estate prices in the early 1990s, the Japanese banking system had expe-
rienced a large increase in nonperforming loans that resulted in the
failure of a number of banking organizations and left others severely
undercapitalized and unable to function effectively.
Moreover, in comparing the recent experience in Japan with the
U.S. experience in the 1930s, it is clear that the Bank of Japan has had
much more limited scope for lowering long-term rates after reachingECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 29
the zero bound (Chart 7). In February 2001, just prior to adoption of
the new operating procedures, the interest rate on government bonds
was only 1.4 percent.36 Thus, when the zero bound became binding in
March 2001, the Bank of Japan had only limited ability to reduce long-
term interest rates further, certainly much less than was available to the
Federal Reserve in 1933 (Chart 1). 
Because the new procedures have only been in effect for 21/ 2 years, it
is difficult to judge their overall success. Initially, the procedures appear
to have been somewhat successful in lowering long-term rates. Thus, for
example, the 10-year government bond rate declined from 1.4 percent
in February 2001 to 0.50 percent in June 2003. 
More recently, however, the 10-year rate has reversed course and has
moved back up to 0.90 percent in July 2003 and to 1.47 percent in
August. This recent backup in rates occurred in the context of new
information suggesting improvement in economic activity and despite
evidence of continuing deflationary pressures. The rise in rates suggests
that the more explicit commitment strategy adopted by the Bank of
Japan may not be sufficient to keep long-term rates stable once financial
markets see signs of improvement in the economy.37
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At the same time, the policy of quantitative easing has not led to an
overall expansion of bank credit. As discussed earlier, an increased supply
of reserves is only likely to lead to an expansion of bank credit if banks are
willing and able to make loans and purchase securities. As shown in Chart
8, however, the Japanese banking system has held much of the increased
supply of reserves as excess reserves in a pattern similar to that in the
United States during the 1930s. While banks have increased their pur-
chases of securities somewhat, a massive contraction in bank lending has
led to an overall reduction in bank credit in the period since March 2001
(Chart 9).38 Thus, as compared to the United States experience in the
1930s, Japan’s use of quantitative easing has appeared to be less effective.
In summary, Japan’s recent encounter with the zero bound has
been much more problematic than the U.S. experience during the
1930s. As compared to the United States, the Bank of Japan has had
less scope to stimulate the economy by reducing longer-term interest
rates once the zero bound was reached. In addition, the stimulus pro-
vided through reserve targeting has been muted by ongoing structural
problems in the banking system that have led to reduced bank lending.
Chart 8
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Moreover, the Bank of Japan’s efforts to manage financial market expec-
tations via a policy commitment strategy underscore the potential
difficulty of relying on this approach. In light of these difficulties, it is
important to explore other policy options available to a central bank.
IV. ADDITIONAL POLICY OPTIONS AT THE 
ZERO BOUND
In a situation like Japan, when reserves targeting is ineffective and
when both short-term and long-term rates are near zero, a central bank
may need to turn to more “nontraditional” methods of implementing
monetary policy. These include: exchange rate depreciation, coordinated
monetary-fiscal policy actions, and direct participation by the central bank
in financial intermediation. Generally speaking, these alternatives are not
first-choice solutions for a central bank either because of concerns about
their effectiveness or because they may be seen as violating established
principles or best practices for central banks. In a worst-case economic sce-
nario, however, a central bank may not have any other options.
Chart 9
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Exchange rate depreciation
One nontraditional approach to the zero bound problem is for the
central bank to try to temporarily lower the foreign exchange value of
its currency in an attempt to stimulate the domestic economy. While
both short-term and long-term interest rates may ultimately run up
against the zero bound, exchange rates, like reserves, are not subject to
this constraint. A lower value of the domestic currency can stimulate
the domestic economy by encouraging exports and may also reduce
deflationary pressures by raising the prices of imported goods. Thus, if
monetary policy can lower the exchange rate, it may be able to circum-
vent the zero bound problem. 
In general, monetary policy can influence exchange rates in two ways.
Because exchange rates are thought to depend partly on interest rate dif-
ferentials between countries, one approach is for a central bank to ease
monetary policy to lower domestic interest rates and thus cause the
domestic currency to depreciate. A second approach is to directly inter-
vene in foreign exchange markets by buying foreign currencies and selling
the domestic currency to lower the value of the domestic currency.39
The zero bound clearly complicates the use of monetary policy to
influence exchange rates since a central bank can no longer lower short-
term domestic interest rates to change interest rate differentials.
Consequently, it must rely on direct intervention in foreign exchange
markets to lower the exchange rate.40 Whether intervention is successful
in lowering the exchange rate is likely to depend on the size of the inter-
vention and how committed the central bank is seen to be to
maintaining a lower exchange rate through future intervention or by
keeping monetary policy accommodative for an extended period of
time. In addition, the behavior of other central banks will be important.
If other central banks do not want their currency to appreciate because
of concerns about their domestic economy, they may also ease policy,
resulting in an unchanged exchange rate. 
Historical evidence on the use of exchange rate depreciation to deal
with the zero bound is relatively limited. One situation occurred in
Switzerland in the late 1970s when a strong Swiss franc threatened to
push the economy into a recession and there was concern about possi-
ble deflation. At the time, short-term interest rates were near zero, andECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 33
there was limited scope for traditional monetary policy. In this context,
the Swiss National Bank used massive foreign exchange intervention in
an attempt to lower the exchange rate and stimulate economic activity.
Although the policy appears to have been very effective in lowering the
exchange rate and increasing economic growth, the large increase in the
money supply that accompanied the intervention was associated with
significant inflationary pressures in subsequent years (Kugler and Rich).
While a number of economists have recommended that the Bank
of Japan pursue temporary exchange rate depreciation as a possible solu-
tion to the zero bound problem, the Bank of Japan has been very
reluctant to adopt this approach.41 The bank has suggested that it does
not have legal authority for foreign exchange intervention except at the
direction of the Ministry of Finance and has also raised a number of
concerns about the potential effectiveness of this approach.42
Coordinated monetary and fiscal policy
A second nontraditional alternative to the zero bound problem is to
provide a coordinated fiscal-monetary policy stimulus. Normally, when
fiscal policy is used to provide economic stimulus, increased govern-
ment spending is financed by higher taxes or by selling bonds. A
disadvantage of both of these financing methods, however, is that they
offset some of the economic stimulus provided by the increased spend-
ing. Thus, for example, bond finance tends to raise market interest
rates, which slows economic activity. 
Alternatively, increased government spending could be financed by
central bank purchases of government securities. By actively purchasing
government debt, the central bank can prevent an increase in market
interest rates and so maximize the stimulus provided by the increased
spending. In effect, the central bank finances the increased spending by
printing money.43
Money-financed government spending may appear to be an attrac-
tive option for an economy mired in a severe recession. Most central
banks are extremely reluctant to pursue this type of policy, however,
because it violates fundamental principles of central banking. Money-
financed fiscal policy is inherently inflationary. In the short run, this
may not be seen as a problem for an economy like Japan that is stuck in34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
a deflationary economic slump. Over the longer run, however, a per-
ceived lack of central bank independence could undermine its ability to
establish a credible commitment to long-run price stability. The Bank
of Japan has strongly resisted suggestions that it should directly finance
government spending for these reasons.44
Promoting the development of capital markets
A third nontraditional approach to conducting monetary policy at
the zero bound focuses on strengthening the monetary policy transmis-
sion mechanism by promoting the development of capital markets.
Generally speaking, financial intermediation occurs in two ways:
through the banking system and through capital markets. Many coun-
tries rely heavily on the banking system to provide the bulk of their
financial intermediation. Indeed, the United States is one of the few
countries where capital markets are sufficiently well-developed to
provide an important financing alternative to banks. 
When an economy relies heavily on banks to provide financial
intermediation, problems in the banking system may lead to a signifi-
cant decline in financial intermediation with adverse effects on
economic activity. In the two historical episodes examined in this
article—the United States in the 1930s and Japan over the past
decade—the weak condition of the banking system appears to have
severely limited the effectiveness of traditional monetary policy. More-
over, in both situations, capital markets were undeveloped and so were
not a viable alternative to the banking system. 
These episodes stand in sharp contrast to recent experience in the
United States where the coexistence of banks and capital markets has
allowed financial intermediation to proceed despite problems in one
sector. For example, capital markets continued to function during the
U.S. banking crisis in the early 1990s. Similarly, the banking system
continued to function effectively when capital markets were affected by
the Asian financial crisis and Russian debt default in the late 1990s. 
This discussion suggests that in situations where traditional mone-
tary policy is limited by the zero bound and the banking system is weak
and dysfunctional, policies aimed at strengthening the development of
capital markets or even bypassing the banking system may be helpful inECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 35
enhancing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Indeed, the Bank of
Japan has actively pursued this approach over the past few years.45 One
way the Bank of Japan has attempted to spur the growth of capital
markets is by progressively relaxing restrictions on eligible collateral for
its open market operations. For example, the Bank has tried to improve
the marketability of private securities and the depth of financial markets
by expanding the list of eligible collateral for repurchase agreements to
include commercial paper and asset-backed securities. 
More recently, the Bank of Japan has gone even further to imple-
ment nontraditional policies aimed at stabilizing the financial system
and supporting the development of capital markets. One of the more
controversial policies has been its decision to purchase stocks held by
commercial banks in an attempt to reduce the effects of stock market
volatility on bank capital and earnings (Bank of Japan, 2002a). As of July
2003, the Bank of Japan had purchased 1,505.9 billion yen worth of
stocks held by commercial banks. In addition, the Bank of Japan has
established a program for the outright purchase of private sector, asset-
backed securities (Bank of Japan, 2003a). In effect, the Bank has decided
to bypass the weak banking system by stepping in to provide financing
directly to the private sector. Such policies are a considerable departure
from standard central bank practices of purchasing only government
securities and no doubt reflect the severity of the banking crisis in Japan.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This article has examined how the zero interest rate bound is likely
to affect the implementation of monetary policy. One principal conclu-
sion to be drawn from the analysis is that the zero bound should not be
viewed as an insurmountable problem for central banks. Even when
short-term interest rates are near zero, a central bank can continue to
ease policy by expanding bank reserves and typically has a number of
methods available to lower longer-term rates. And, in the event that all
interest rates are near zero or the banking system is dysfunctional, a
variety of nontraditional policy options may be available. At the same
time, all of these alternatives come with associated costs and difficulties
and, to be effective, require a central bank to communicate effectively
with financial markets and the public.36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
If the zero bound is not a particularly serious problem, there must
be an alternative explanation for the limited effectiveness of monetary
policy in the United States in the 1930s and in Japan more recently.
The analysis presented in this article suggests a key factor common to
both episodes was a weakened banking system that reduced the effec-
tiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. In this
situation, there may be limits to what monetary policy can be expected
to accomplish even in the absence of difficulties posed by the zero
bound, and a central bank may need to rely more heavily on nontradi-
tional policy approaches. 
Finally, the analysis presented in this article suggests that the zero
bound is unlikely to pose serious difficulties for Federal Reserve policy
in the current U.S. economic environment. With the federal funds rate
target at 1 percent, the Federal Reserve still has some scope for further
policy ease before the zero bound is reached. Moreover, should short-
term rates hit zero, there is still considerable scope for lowering
longer-term interest rates. And, with a healthy banking system and
capital markets, the monetary transmission mechanism should function
effectively. In this environment, whether monetary policy is effective in
stimulating economic activity will likely depend more on whether
households and firms respond to the lower cost and greater availability
of credit than on the particular way the Federal Reserve implements
policy. Indeed, given the important role of policy expectations in the
monetary policy transmission process, the biggest challenge facing the
Federal Reserve at the zero bound is likely to be the effective communi-
cation of its zero bound strategy to financial markets and the public. ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 37
ENDNOTES
1While a negative nominal rate may not appear possible, in practice yields on
short-term Treasury securities were negative during much of the 1930s and nega-
tive yields have recently been observed for overnight loans in Japan. The existence
of negative yields appears to be due to institutional features that do not function
in normal circumstances. For example, Cecchetti argues that negative yields in
the United States in the 1930s were largely due to institutional features of Trea-
sury debt management.
2One way of seeing the difference in information required is to consider how
monetary policy would be implemented in a textbook IS-LM model. In this
framework, reserves targeting involves positioning the LM curve along the IS
curve to achieve the desired interest rate/real output combination. This requires
knowledge of money demand and bank reserves demand, which help determine
the position of the LM curve, and the IS curve. In contrast, interest rate targeting
only requires information on the IS curve. 
3Some evidence in support of this point can be found in the behavior of
financial markets during the period from 1979 to 1982 when the Federal Reserve
used a nonborrowed reserves operating target rather than a federal funds rate tar-
get. This period was characterized by a large increase in the volatility of both
short-term and long-term interest rates. This increased volatility may have been
due, in part, to greater difficulty of financial market participants in judging the
likely path for future short-term rates under reserves targeting. 
4Ordinarily, these limits are unlikely to be encountered. There is some evi-
dence that they may have been important in the United States in the early 1930s.
It has been argued, for example, that restrictions on eligible assets may have lim-
ited discount window lending and that open market operations may have been
limited by collateral restrictions for Federal Reserve notes. For a discussion, see
Chandler (pp. 225-33 and pp. 182-91). The issue reemerged more recently a few
years ago when forecasts of budget surpluses and a declining supply of govern-
ment securities raised concerns about whether the Federal Reserve might run out
of eligible assets to conduct open market operations.
5In practice, the federal funds market could see reduced activity or cease to
function before the funds rate reached zero. Since there are transactions costs
associated with brokering activity, this activity could become unprofitable with a
funds rate somewhat above zero. In addition, because federal funds transactions
are generally uncollateralized, activity would likely cease once the return from
lending funds no longer covered the potential credit risk of the transaction. 
6The zero bound could also pose some technical problems for a central bank
in providing reserves via repurchase agreements. For example, because of reduced
functioning of overnight markets, the central bank could experience difficulty in
achieving its desired amount of reserve provision. In this event, the central bank
might need to switch from repurchase transactions to outright purchases of secu-
rities in conducting open market operations. More generally, to the extent that
the behavior of depository institutions and the public were to change in a zero
interest rate environment, a central bank might experience greater difficulty in
determining the appropriate amount of reserves to supply. 38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
7Depository institutions are also subject to cost pressures to the extent lower
interest rates reduce interest margins. However, at very low interest rates deposit
insurance may make bank deposits more attractive. 
8This figure is a simplification designed to illustrate the point that a central
bank can alter bank reserves even if short-term rates cannot be lowered further
because of the zero bound. In the more general situation when the zero bound is
not effective, reserves and short-term interest rates are jointly determined. 
9These additional options include using monetary policy to influence
exchange rates, pursuing coordinated fiscal and monetary policy, and attempting
to improve the functioning of financial markets and institutions. One possible
channel that is not discussed in this article is the possibility monetary policy may
influence the economy via wealth effects on consumer spending. Although wealth
effects may be an important factor influencing the behavior of the economy in a
low interest rate environment, particularly if an economy is experiencing goods or
asset price deflation, their quantitative significance is unclear, and they are
unlikely to be a reliable channel through which monetary policy might operate.
10Because of concerns about potential interest rate risk, banks will tend to
purchase short to medium-term securities rather than longer-term securities.
However, as bank security purchases push down short-term and medium-term
rates, other investors will have incentive to increase the maturity of their invest-
ments, which should help lower longer-term rates. 
11It should be noted that under this procedure, a central bank would not
necessarily need to purchase large amounts of securities, as it would only make
purchases if market rates threatened to move above the ceiling rate.
12For a more detailed discussion of these issues in the context of the U.S.
experience during and after World War II, see Hetzel and Leach. 
13A more detailed technical discussion of the role of monetary policy expecta-
tions in the context of the zero bound can be found in Eggertsson and Woodford. 
14The yield curve also contains term or liquidity premia that would nor-
mally give an upward slope to the yield curve even if monetary policy was
expected to be unchanged. These premia are generally thought to be relatively
small and to vary over time. While some economists believe that the behavior of
these premia might be influenced by monetary policy, their behavior is not well
understood, and they are not discussed in this article.
15As discussed above, this would only occur if the markets’ interpretation of
the commitment statement suggested a lower path for future short-term rates.
16For a more complete discussion of the role of expectations and policy com-
mitment in dealing with the zero bound, see Eggertsson and Woodford.
17A somewhat less prominent example is the case of Switzerland in 1978-79
where the Swiss National Bank briefly encountered the zero bound. This case is
discussed very briefly in the fourth section of this article. For a more indepth dis-
cussion, see Kugler and Rich. 
18In these episodes, the Federal Reserve and Bank of Japan have also been
criticized for errors in decision making and in implementing policy. This article
does not consider these issues directly and focuses on whether policy actions,
when taken, were effective.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 39
19Discussions of a possible “liquidity trap” in the United States during the
1930s were prominent in most macroeconomic textbooks of the 1950s and
1960s. The classic treatment of the issue is in Brunner and Meltzer. The term
“liquidity trap” had essentially disappeared from textbooks and the economics
lexicon until revived in Krugman’s recent discussion of Japan. 
20These estimates of the yield curve are found in Cecchetti. 
21The shape of the yield curve suggests that rates were expected to rise sig-
nificantly over the next two years, suggesting an economic rebound. In fact, on
an annual basis, real GDP showed strong growth over the next four years.
22One of the more interesting aspects of this increase in reserves is that it
occurred not through open market operations or increased discount window lend-
ing but through inflows of gold into the United States after the United States raised
the price of gold in 1934. Discount window lending was negligible because the dis-
count rate was above market rates, and the overall size of the Federal Reserve’s secu-
rity portfolio was little changed during this period. For a more detailed discussion,
see Meulendyke (pp. 30-33) or Chandler (p. 244, pp. 296-304).
23For additional discussion of these developments, see Chandler (p. 259). 
24Brunner and Meltzer’s classic treatment found little evidence of a liquidity
trap. More recent studies come to a similar conclusion. See, for example, the
papers by Hanes and by Orphanides.
25This policy had two elements. First, the Bank of Japan conducted open
market operations to maintain a target rate near zero. Second, the Bank of Japan
attempted to lower longer-term interest rates by managing financial market
expectations of future policy actions. It did this by committing to keep the inter-
est rate target near zero until “deflationary concerns were dispelled.” For a more
detailed discussion, see Oda and Okina.
26This point is noted by Oda and Okina (p. 324) and by Orphanides (p. 14)
and is clearly reflected in the published record of the Bank of Japan’s Monetary
Policy meetings during this period.
27A case can be made that the “prospect” of hitting the zero bound may have
constrained policy much earlier than the March 2001 date used in this article. In
particular, the Bank of Japan may have wished to ease policy by more than the 50
basis points available during the Asian financial crisis in 1998 and may have
refrained from doing so because of the need to adopt new operating procedures. 
28The zero bound has had some impact on the functioning of short-term
money markets in Japan, especially in the overnight market, where volume has
dropped significantly and most lending is now collateralized. In addition, money
market fund balances have declined but this has generally been attributed more to
concerns about credit quality in one type of money fund than to low interest
rates. Volume in the commercial paper market has expanded somewhat, but this
is likely a result of attempts by the Bank of Japan to support the development of
capital markets as discussed later in the article.
29These discussions can be found in the minutes of the bank’s Monetary Pol-
icy meetings available on the Bank of Japan’s website, and a good summary can be
found in Oda and Okina.
30The Bank of Japan was formally granted operational independence in 1998.40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
31The statement does not specify the likely timeframe or the criteria for
deciding when to change policy. In fact, policymakers at the Bank of Japan
tended to rely on measures of economic activity, such as the growth of private
demand, rather than measures on inflation in deciding to end the ZIRP in
August 2000. 
32Evidence that markets believed that the ZIRP would be short-lived can be
found in forward interest rates. As noted by Oda and Okina, financial markets
consistently believed that the policy would last no longer than a year ahead. Thus,
according to the expectations theory of the term structure, there should be little
effect on long-term rates.
33Prior to the change in operating procedures, the Bank of Japan had limited
its monthly purchases of long-term securities to an amount equal to the growth in
its outstanding currency liabilities. After the change in procedures, the scope for
securities purchases was expanded by setting an upper limit for the total stock of
securities based on the outstanding stock of currency liabilities. Because holdings of
long-term securities were well below this ceiling at the time of the change, the
amount of securities that could be purchased in the short run was greatly expanded.
34In official statements, the Bank of Japan has emphasized that the role of
increased purchases of long-term government securities has been to augment its
efforts to expand reserves, especially in situations where short-term repurchase
operations were not able to meet reserve objectives. The bank has been explicit
that these purchases are not designed to support prices of government securities
or finance government spending. Regardless of motivation, however, these pur-
chases should contribute to lower long-term rates.
35While the more recent commitment strategy appears to be superior to the
previous one, a number of commentators have suggested that the Bank of Japan
needs to go much further and adopt an explicit inflation targeting or price level
targeting framework (Svensson, Bernanke). The current approach used by the
Bank of Japan is clearly temporary, and there may be considerable uncertainty in
financial markets about how policy would be implemented once deflation has
been overcome as measured by the core CPI. An inflation targeting or price level
targeting framework would remove this source of uncertainty about future policy
and, as a practical matter, would likely result in an easier policy stance for a longer
period of time since the inflation target would presumably be set above zero. One
concern that has been raised about the effectiveness of inflation or price level tar-
geting in the Japanese situation is whether the introduction of such a framework
would be seen as any more credible by financial markets than other attempts to
manage expectations. 
36In January 1999, just prior to the start of the ZIRP, the 10-year Japanese
government bond rate had already fallen considerably, from a peak of over 6 per-
cent in 1990 to less that 2 percent. Over the duration of the ZIRP, the 10-year
rate was essentially unchanged. 
37In recognition of this difficulty, the Bank of Japan has recently attempted
to clarify the conditions under which the policy of quantitative easing might be
ended (Bank of Japan 2003c). Two necessary conditions are that the core infla-
tion rate remains above zero for a period of months and that the Bank does not
anticipate a resumption of deflationary pressures. Even if these conditions are
met, however, the Bank indicated that it might continue to maintain the policy.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2003 41
38Bank lending has continued to decline even after adjusting for write-offs of
nonperforming loans (Bank of Japan 2003b, Chart 37).
39Intervention to lower the exchange rate results in an increase in domestic
bank reserves and the money supply. The central bank can allow the expansion of
reserves and money supply to occur or it can “sterilize” the intervention by selling
securities in an open market operation to neutralize the reserve effects. Most stud-
ies find little effect of sterilized intervention on exchange rates. That is, interven-
tion does not appear to influence exchange rates unless accompanied by a change
in domestic monetary policy or the expectation that policy will change in the
future. One recent study by Fatum and Hutchinson does suggest that sterilized
intervention by the Bank of Japan has measurable effects on the exchange rate,
but only over very short periods of time.
40The use of intervention when the zero bound is reached would almost cer-
tainly be unsterilized since the central bank would likely want the stimulative
effects of reserve growth to occur. Sterilizing the intervention in this situation
would lead to a sale of government securities that would raise longer-term inter-
est rates offsetting some of the effects of the intervention. In some respects,
exchange rate depreciation through unsterilized intervention is analogous to a
policy of direct purchases of long-term government securities. In each case, there
is a direct effect on asset prices via purchases of assets that is accompanied by a
quantitative effect through increased bank reserves.
41The most well-known proposal is by Svensson.
42See, for example, the discussion in Oda and Okina (p. 338 and pp. 347-
48). More recently, in November 2002, the Japanese Ministry of Finance
requested that the Bank of Japan refrain from sterilizing foreign exchange inter-
vention, in part, to signal to financial markets that a lower value of the yen was
desirable. Members of the Bank’s Policy Board indicated that under the “quantita-
tive easing” approach the distinction between sterilized and unsterilized interven-
tion was immaterial because the Bank was already oversupplying reserves to the
banking system, and members were reluctant to tie changes in the quantitative
reserves objective directly to the amount of intervention (Bank of Japan 2002b).
43This approach can also be viewed as a combination of fiscal policy and a
monetary policy that pegs interest rates on government securities as discussed in
the second section of this article.
44See, for example, the discussion in Oda and Okina (pp. 341-47).
45This can be viewed as a way of reducing the so-called “external finance pre-
mium,” a feature of imperfect capital markets that raises borrowing costs. For a
discussion, see Gertler.42 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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